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Summary

Introduction

This issue brief uses cumulative data from the nationally
representative, General Social Survey (1972–2004) (Davis
& Smith 2004), to explore how rural Americans diﬀer from
their urban and suburban peers on religious involvement
and in their attitudes toward politically contested moral
issues, namely, abortion and same-sex relations. The data
indicate that rural Americans are slightly more religious
than their metropolitan neighbors as indicated by weekly
church attendance and having had a born-again experience.
Rural Americans, however, do not comprise a homogeneous
group. There are signiﬁcant regional diﬀerences, with rural
Southerners much more likely than their rural counterparts
in Eastern, Midwestern, and Western parts of the country
to be highly religious. And while rural Americans are more
likely to oppose abortion and same-sex relations than their
non-rural neighbors, there is also evidence of variation
in their attitudes toward these issues. Like Americans as
a whole, rural Americans vary their opinion on abortion
depending on the speciﬁc circumstances. Generation also
matters, and this is especially evident in the fact that younger
individuals are more tolerant of same-sex relations than
their parents and grandparents. It is also noteworthy that
religiosity trumps rural/non-rural location when it comes
to social conservatism. Highly religious rural and non-rural
Americans alike are much more likely to oppose abortion
and same-sex relations than their less religious counterparts.
Acknowledging and responding to these important nuances in the cultural values of rural Americans may improve
the ability of both Democrats and Republicans to develop
connections throughout rural America. In sum, it would be
a mistake to categorize rural Americans as a single voting
bloc. Rural America is diverse, and behavior, attitudes and
beliefs vary by region.

In the turmoil of the current political climate, election
season brings renewed political and media attention to rural
America. Voter dissatisfaction with the war in Iraq, the
economy, and with the Republican leadership has made several congressional races appear competitive for Democrats as
they strategize to eke out a majority in the House and maybe
even in the Senate. The rural vote was critical to the success
of the Republican Party in both the 2000 and 2004 elections,
and the ability of the Republicans to maintain control of the
House and Senate in 2006 depends in large part on how well
their candidates do among rural voters (Greenberg, Walker,
& Greener 2005). Tracking polls indicate that “Republicans
and Democrats are essentially tied in competitive rural
districts and states” (Greenberg & Greener 2006:3). The
Democrats, however, have a clear edge over Republicans
among Independents (Greenberg & Greener 2006: 3). How
this will play out on election day remains to be seen.
Party loyalty, the salience of the mix of speciﬁc local and
national issues, and candidate charisma are all important
factors in determining votes. We know that moral values
matter to Americans and that they especially matter to rural
voters. Even though “moral values” and “social issues” are
not top priorities in the current polls (Greenberg & Greener
2006), values nonetheless are never far from many voters’
minds and invariably exert an important inﬂuence on their
election decisions. In this issue brief, we examine rural
Americans’ current attitudes on two hot-button, value-laden
issues: abortion and same-sex relations. We use national
survey data from the General Social Survey (GSS) conducted
on a near-yearly basis since 1972 by the National Opinion
Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago
(Davis & Smith 2004). These data allow us to compare rural
Americans with their urban and suburban peers and to explore how rural Americans diﬀer on these value-based issues
by region
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Figure 1. Weekly Church Attendance by region1
and Rural/Non-rural Location, 1998-2004
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2004)

and generation, two important factors that shape cultural
expectations and political behavior. Before examining
these trends, we ﬁrst contextualize their relevance to rural
Americans by considering the importance of religion.

Rural Americans are More Religious
The United States is one of the most highly religious
countries in the western world, boasting remarkably high
and relatively stable levels of church attendance and belief
in God and the afterlife. More than 300,000 local church
congregations provide church members and community
residents with an impressive array of worship, social,
cultural, educational, and counseling activities (e.g., Chaves
2004: 3). Not surprisingly, given the small town life of rural
residents, the church is a focal point for many, a place where
neighbors worship, socialize, and reﬂect on the state of the
country. Rural Americans’ denominational preferences tend
to vary in distinct ways by region. In the South, for example,
most people are Protestant (77 percent), and by and large
they are Baptists, mostly Southern Baptists, whose conservative theology has long made a mark on Southern culture and
everyday life. Catholics dominate in the East; the Midwest
is more mixed, home to a large proportion of Protestants
(mostly Lutherans, Methodists, and Baptists) and a sizable
number of Catholics; and the West remains the most
“unchurched” region in the country.
Southerners (36%) are more likely than Americans living
in the Midwest (32%), the Northeast (29%) and the West
(25%) to attend church on a weekly or almost weekly basis.
And within each region, rural Americans are slightly more
likely than those living in urban or suburban areas to be
frequent church-goers. (see Figure 1).

More Rural Americans are
Born-Again, Especially Southerners
One of the most interesting changes in the American
religious landscape since the 1970s is the steady increase in
the proportion of Americans who report being born-again
Christians. According to Gallup data, just over one-third
(35 percent) of Americans in 1976 said that they had had
a born-again experience, while 42 percent report so today
(Gallup poll data, various years; Winseman 2005: 119). The
GSS data show a similar trend increase though at a lower
incidence, with 36 percent responding that they have had
a born-again experience. The increase in the proportion of
born-again Christians is interesting for a number of reasons.
Most particularly for political observers, its signiﬁcance lies
in the fact that born-again Americans, who tend to fall into
the “evangelical” category in national polls, are more likely
than others to express a biblically grounded conservative
stance on moral and social issues and thus to support political candidates, Republicans mostly, who espouse a platform
advocating traditional family values. Moreover, born-again
Christians embrace the exclusivist biblical command that
one must be born-again in order to attain salvation and
hence they are likely to be suspicious of candidates who
though religious, are not evangelical, and of others who
embrace a more diﬀuse religious identity or who favor social
polices that aﬃrm the religious pluralism of American
society (Wuthnow 2005).
According to the GSS data, Southerners are far more likely
than Americans living elsewhere to describe themselves as
born-again. Fifty percent of Southerners say they are bornagain. By contrast, only 32 percent of Midwesterners, 30
percent of those in the West, and 22 percent of Easterners
identify as born-agains (see Figure 2).
Regional variation aside, across America, people living
in rural areas and in counties with small towns are more
likely than more metropolitan residents to report being
born-again (see Figure 3). Given the link we have noted

Figure 2. Percentage of Americans Who Report Having Had a Born-Again Experience, by Region
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Figure 3. Percentage of Americans Who Report
Having Had a Born-Again Experience, by Place Type

Figure 4. Percentage of Americans Who Report
Having Had a Born-Again Experience, Classified by
Region and Rural/Non-Rural Location
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between born-again status and political views, this suggests
that rural America will continue to be a bulwark of moral
conservatism notwithstanding the cultural changes that
will inevitably characterize rural America as it adapts to
demographic and socio-economic change (e.g. Johnson
2006).
This general pattern holds within each region except in
the Midwest, where urban residents are slightly more likely
than those living in rural areas to report being born-again
(see Figure 4).
Young adults in the GSS generally tend to be less interested in religion than their parents and grandparents, and
we see this pattern too in who identiﬁes as born-again:
Members of Generation X (those born between 1966 and
1975) are less likely than their parents to report having had a
born-again experience (Figure 5).
Many members of the baby-boom generation embraced
born-again Christianity as part of the larger cultural and
lifestyle experimentation that they spearheaded (Roof 1999),
and we still see the eﬀects of this today, with large proportions of their cohort in each region identifying as born-again
(see Figure 6).
Notwithstanding these generational and regional differences, rural residence, once again, is a further source of
variation. Within each generational group, rural individuals
are the most, and suburbanites the least, likely to report a
born-again experience (see Figure 7).

Figure 5. Percentage of Americans Who Report
Having Had a Born-Again Experience, Classified by
Birth Cohort
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Figure 6. Percentage of Americans Who Report
Having Had a Born-Again Experience, Classified by
Birth Cohort and Region
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Values in Rural America: Abortion
Attitudes Towards Abortion Remain Steadfast, but
Circumstances Matter
The legalization of abortion in 1973, following the U.S.
Supreme Court’s landmark Roe v. Wade decision, is one of
the most signiﬁcant markers of social change in America’s
recent past and the source of much political and cultural
controversy. Once legal, the incidence of abortion rose
steadily in the 1970s and 1980s. This was then followed by
a noticeable decline and stabilization in the 1990s. In 1975,
for example, 25 of every 100 pregnancies ended in abortion; in 1980, it was 30 per 100 pregnancies and remained
so throughout the decade. By 1995, however, it had declined
to 26, and in 2000, to 25 of every 100 pregnancies (see Finer
and Henshaw 2003: 8).
Despite the recent dip in the incidence of abortion, the
issue continues to be politically controversial. The recently
reconﬁgured Supreme Court, with the successful elevation of
two conservative justices (Chief Justice John Roberts and
Associate Justice Samuel Alito), stirred the ever-bubbling
cauldron of speculation about federal restrictions on
abortion, including a possible overturn of Roe v. Wade.
In spring 2006, South Dakota passed the country’s most
restrictive abortion legislation since Roe, and abortion is
expected to be an issue in several congressional and statewide electoral contests this year (e.g., Davey 2006).
Despite the intensity of ongoing pro-choice and pro-life
activism since the early 1970s, American attitudes toward
abortion have remained steadfast over the years. The overall
year-by-year trend traced in Figure 8 underscores the
remarkable stability in abortion attitudes, despite some very
slight, occasional dips and rises.
The solidity of abortion views is further illustrated in
Figure 9; whether interviewed in 1975 or in 2005, a similar
majority of Americans (about 60 percent) agreed that abortion should be legal but with some restrictions. Similarly,
approximately one-ﬁfth of Americans in 1975 and in 2005
agreed that abortion should be legal across all circumstances,
and another one-ﬁfth agreed that abortion should be illegal
across all circumstances (Gallup poll data, various years).
According to the GSS, the vast majority of Americans believe that abortion should be legal in diﬃcult circumstances,
such as when the mother’s health is endangered (90 percent),
in the cases of rape (82 percent), or when there is a strong
chance of a fetal defect (81 percent). Substantially fewer
Americans, however, endorse abortion in circumstances of
economic hardship (48 percent), or as an option for an unmarried woman (45 percent), or for a married woman who
does not want more children (44 percent), or indeed for any
reason (40 percent).2
This variability is an important reminder that, although
there is solid support for abortion as a legal option in American society, Americans nonetheless make moral distinctions
about the acceptability of abortion depending on the con-

Figure 7. Percentage of Americans Who Report
Having Had a Born-Again Experience, Classified by
Birth Cohort and Rural/Non-Rural Location
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Figure 8. Percentage of Americans Who Favor Abortion for Any reason, by Year
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Figure 9. American Abortion Attitudes, 1975-2005
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text. This gradient in abortion opinion indicates that politicians and activists who frame the abortion issue in terms of
a polarized pro-choice or pro-life debate fail to speak to the
nuanced complexity with which most Americans evaluate
the issue. The circumstantial distinctions Americans make
in regard to abortion also suggest that observers should not
be too surprised by current moves across several states to
restrict abortion; these initiatives are, to a large extent, in
keeping with the long-standing view shared by many Americans that abortion should be legally available but restricted.

Abortion Attitudes by Region:
Rural Southerners are Less Likely to
Support Abortion but Circumstances Still Matter

Figure 10: Percentage of Americans Who Agree
with Abortion, by Circumstance and Classified by
Region
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Examining abortion attitudes across the four U.S. regions, it
is evident that Southerners are less likely than other Americans to support abortion across the various circumstances
that women confront. Regional diﬀerences are especially
striking when Southerners are compared with residents
of the Northeast and West. Nevertheless, as is true for the
nation as a whole, within each region, Americans vary in
their opinion when abortion is being considered for diﬃcult
medical (e.g., when there is a chance of a fetal defect) or
nonmedical reasons (e.g., if the woman is unmarried) (see
Figure 10).
The stability in abortion attitudes apparent for Americans as a whole since the mid-1970s is equally characteristic
of urban, suburban, and rural Americans. It is also clear,
however, that at each point in time, rural Americans are less
likely than urban and suburban residents to support abor-
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tion. For example, as indicated in Table 1, currently only 37
percent of rural Americans compared with, on average, 49
percent of nonrural Americans agree with abortion when
a woman cannot aﬀord to have more children. As with national and regional trends, rural Americans are consistently
more likely to endorse abortion in diﬃcult circumstances
(e.g., fetal defect, rape) and to oppose abortion for economic
and other personal reasons (see Table 1).
Among rural Americans, rural Southerners (bottom
panel of Table 1) are the least likely to agree with abortion.
Figure 11 shows that there is a persistent gap between the

Table 1. mean Percentage of Americans Who Support Abortion by Reason and Rural/Non-Rural Location
in the 1970s and 2000s, Nationally and in the South
N AT I O N A L
Urban

1970s
Suburban

Rural

Urban

2000s
Suburban

Rural

Any reason

43

45

29

44

51

35

Married and wants no more children

49

53

40

46

50

37

Low income; cannot aﬀord

55

60

48

48

51

37

Chance of serious defect

82

85

83

79

83

77

Pregnant as result of rape

83

88

82

81

84

78

SOUTH

Any reason

35

48

21

34

46

27

Married and wants no more children

41

54

32

39

46

27

Low income; cannot aﬀord

48

59

41

41

45

29

Chance of serious defect

77

86

80

74

80

72

Pregnant as result of rape

78

87

77

78

81

74
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rural South and rural Americans as a whole, with the trends
showing the rural South as the most opposed to abortion for
any reason. The only exceptions across the 25-year interval
are 1980 and 1994 when opinions converged.

Figure 11: Percentage of Americans Who Support
Abortion for Any Reason, by Rural/Non-Rural
Location and Year
100

Younger Americans Share Parents’ Attitudes toward
Abortion
Thus far we have focused on the aggregate trends in abortion attitudes. These analyses grouped people regardless of
age or generation. Figure 12 presents abortion attitudes by
generation or birth cohort and by rural/non-rural residence.
Among each generation, the ﬁndings show rural Americans
are more likely than those living in either urban or suburban locations to disagree with abortion. This is especially
true among rural Southerners (see Figure 13). Cohort itself
has very little eﬀect. Although the oldest, pre-World War
II generation is the most likely to oppose abortion for any
reason, the remaining three cohorts do not appear markedly
diﬀerent. Of particular note, Generation Xers and their baby
boomer parents share the same basic proﬁle on abortion attitudes. This generational stability in abortion views is further
indication of the relatively settled nature of abortion opinion
(see Figure 8)—notwithstanding the ongoing public debate
stoked by advocates on both the political right and left. This
suggests that whatever changes might occur in abortion law
and public policy over the next several years, they are unlikely to be driven by the eﬀorts of middle-aged Americans;
today’s younger cohorts share their parents’ views on abortion and it is unlikely that they will change as they age.
In sum, American abortion attitudes have remained
remarkably stable since the 1970s; there is a solid consensus
supporting the legalization of abortion. At the same time,
however, Americans’ abortion views are not easily summarized as either pro-choice or pro-life. Americans are
consistently more likely to endorse abortion in diﬃcult circumstances (e.g. fetal health and rape) and to oppose it for
family-planning reasons. Southerners and rural Americans
are more likely than others to disagree with abortion. From
a political standpoint, the fact that Americans diﬀerentiate among the reasons for abortion suggest that state-wide
initiatives to impose certain restriction on the availability of
abortion may garner strong support especially in states (like
South Dakota) that have a substantial rural population.

Values in Rural America: Same-Sex
Relations
Overall, Americans’ Approval of Same-Sex
Relations is Rising but Southerners are More Likely
to Disapprove
Although American attitudes on abortion have remained
remarkably stable since the mid-1970s, their attitudes on
same-sex relations have changed considerably. The heated
public debate over same-sex marriage underscores the noted
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Figure 12. Percentage of Americans Who Support
Abortion for Any reason, by Rural/Non-rural
Location and Birth Cohort
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Figure 13. Percentage of Americans Who Support
Abortion for Any Reason, by Rural Region and
Birth Cohort
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unease Americans have toward the public visibility and recognition of gay relations. Nevertheless, although seemingly
at odds with the intensity of the public rhetoric condemning
gay relations, Americans’ disapproval of same-sex relations
has been quietly inching downward, according to the GSS.
During the 1970s and 1980s (1972–1982 and 1983–1991), 86
percent of Americans expressed the view that homosexual
sex is wrong. This ﬁgure dropped to 75 percent in the 1990s
(1992–1997) and most recently, to 70 percent (1998–2004).
This recent decline in opposition to same-sex relations is
equally characteristic of rural, urban, and suburban Americans (Figure 14).
Southerners are far more likely than other Americans to
disapprove of same-sex relations. Currently, a substantial
three-quarters (75 percent) of those living in the South endorse the view that same-sex relations are always or almost
always wrong; this is true of fewer than two-thirds of Midwesterners (62 percent) and of only approximately one-half
of Westerners (52 percent) and Northeasterners (49 percent)
(see Figure 15).
Paralleling the variation among Americans on abortion
attitudes, rural Americans are consistently more opposed
to same-sex relations than their urban and suburban peers.
Among rural Americans, once again, those living in the
South are the most conservative on this issue (see Figure 16).

Figure 14. Percentage of Americans Who Say that
Same-Sex Relations Are Wrong, by Rural/NonRural Location and Year
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Source: General Social Survey, 1972–2004 (Davis and Smith 2004)

Figure 15. Percentage of Americans Who Say that
Same-Sex Relations Are Wrong, by Region, 2000–2004
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Young Americans are More Accepting of Same-Sex
Relations than their Parents
Nonetheless, as Figure 14 shows, the acceptance of same-sex
relations has increased even among the more conservative
rural Americans. There are, however, notable generational
diﬀerences in attitudes toward same-sex relations. Figure 17
indicates that members of Generation X are the least likely to
disapprove of same-sex relations, and each ascending cohort
is less tolerant than its successor. Thus, unlike with abortion,
Generation X is not only more accepting than the World
War II generations, but they are also more accepting than
their parents’ generation. Urban and suburban members of
each generation are similar in their views toward same-sex
relations, whereas rural Americans and, most notably, rural
Southerners (see Figure 18) are the most opposed to samesex relations.
What does this generational shift in same-sex attitudes
portend for the future? On the one hand, it seems reasonable
to assume that the increasing approval of same-sex relations
will continue as younger cohorts come of age and supplant
the less tolerant opinions of older cohorts. On the other
hand, although Americans have become more accepting of
homosexuality in recent years, their favorable attitude may
not necessarily translate to speciﬁc policy stances, such as
legalization of same-sex civil unions or marriages. Moreover,
as younger cohorts marry and establish families of their
own, they may be less willing to endorse public policies that
they might view as threatening the cultural dominance of
the “traditional” family. These various factors suggest that we
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Figure 16. Percentage of Americans Who Say that
Same-Sex Relations Are Wrong, by Region and
Rural/Non-Rural Location, 2000–2004
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should not be too surprised if approval of gay rights plateaus,
or even reverses slightly, depending on how the question of
same-sex marriage is resolved. It is noteworthy that although
nationwide support for same-sex marriage increased from
27 percent in 1996 to 36 percent in the ﬁrst half of 2005, the
trend data show an ebb and ﬂow in American opinion on the
issue over the past year coinciding with the increased intensity of the public debate. Moreover, support for gay marriage
is slight overall. 3

Figure 17. Percentage of Americans Who Say that
Same-Sex Relations Are Wrong, by Rural/Non-Rural
Location and Birth Cohort, 2000–2004
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Highly Religious Individuals Share Attitudes Toward
Same-Sex Relations Irrespective of Rural-Urban
Diﬀerences
As we would expect, conservative moral values, as indicated
by disapproval of abortion and of same-sex relations, are
strongest among the most religious Americans. Nonetheless, there is signiﬁcant interdenominational variation on
these issues. The general pattern shows that evangelicals
are the most conservative, whereas Catholics and mainline
Protestants are less so. These diﬀerences reﬂect important
theological and cultural diﬀerences among the various
denominational traditions in America. More immediately,
they also underscore the challenge that confronts politicians
who tend to assume that “values-voters” all speak the same
language and can be mobilized by a similarly uniform political rhetoric. The denominational diﬀerences that characterize Americans’ attitudes on abortion and same-sex relations
show that this is not the case.
Denominational variation aside, it is interesting nonetheless to examine trends in social conservatism among
highly religious individuals. It is evident from Figure 19 that
whether we measure religious involvement either as having
had a born-again experience or in terms of weekly/almost
weekly church attendance, religious individuals living in
rural areas are far less likely than their peers in urban and
suburban settings to support abortion for any reason. Once
again, this pattern is especially pronounced among religious
individuals in the rural South.
We see much greater homogenization among religiously
involved individuals in attitudes toward same-sex relations.
Figure 20 reveals that whether urban, suburban, or rural,
at least 80 percent of highly religious Americans in the GSS
oppose same-sex relations, although rural residents are
slightly more likely than their nonrural peers to be negatively disposed toward gays. The solidity in anti-gay opinion
among highly religious individuals irrespective of their
urban or rural location is striking. It suggests that opposition to same-sex relations is of such critical importance to
religiously involved Americans that it is able to override the
more general urban-rural divide that tends to characterize
Americans as a whole.
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Figure 18. Percentage of Americans Who say that
Same-Sex Relations Are Wrong, by Rural Region and
Birth Cohort, 2000–2004
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Figure 19. Percentage of Americans who have had
a born-again experience or Who Attend Church
Weekly/Almost Weekly and who Support Abortion
(for any reason) by Rural/Non-rural Location
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Figure 20. Percentage of Americans in 2006 Who
Report Having Had a Born-Again Experience or
Attend Church Weekly/Almost Weekly and Who
Oppose Same-sex Relations, by Rural/Non-Rural
Location
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Conclusion: Church, Values, and
Politics in Rural America
Rural Americans compose nearly one-ﬁfth (17 percent) of
the nation’s population. Although they are often marginalized by policy-making and cultural elites, they are nonetheless a signiﬁcant political constituency with the ability to
swing electoral outcomes. The ﬁndings of this brief on the
place of religion and values in rural America are quite unambiguous. Rural Americans are more likely than their metropolitan neighbors to attend church, and in particular, to
identify as born-again Christians, and by extension are likely
to embrace the traditional views associated with Christian
exclusivism. They are also more likely to oppose abortion
across a range of diverse circumstances and to oppose samesex relations.
Yet, this proﬁle of moral conservatism belies the cultural
variation that exists across rural America. Rural Americans
are not a homogenized bloc who speak with one voice; many
rural Americans, though a small minority, eschew church
and religious involvement, and many support abortion and
approve of same-sex relations. Moreover, as with Americans
as a whole, rural Americans do not think of complex moral
issues such as abortion in simple “black-and-white,” prochoice/pro-life terms. Rather, they diﬀerentiate their stance
on abortion depending on the speciﬁc circumstances of the
decision. Generation also matters in rural America, with
younger individuals being less conservative on some issues
(most notably, same-sex relations) than their parents and
grandparents. Most particularly, the opinions and views of
rural Americans vary by region. Rural Southerners are undoubtedly the most conservative, and the gap in their views
and those of their rural compatriots in the East and West is
especially striking. Rural Midwesterners tend to be less con-

servative than their Southern neighbors but more conservative than rural Americans in the East and West. Nevertheless, depending on the issue, it is also the case that religiously
involved rural Americans can share the same views as their
religious peers living in cities and suburbs; homosexuality is
one such issue domain.
Our portrait of values in rural America underscores the
wisdom in T. P. O’ Neill’s often-quoted aphorism that “all
politics is local.” In short, despite the clear patterns in the
aggregate data, there is no political package that will be
equally attractive to all rural voters in any given election
contest. The ﬁndings presented here, however, make clear
that whatever the local salience of the varied issues being
contested, it is unlikely that a majority of rural voters is
going to vote for candidates whose policies are at odds with
the social conservatism embraced by rural Americans. So
while today, the war in Iraq and the state of the economy
are major concerns for rural and urban Americans alike, it
would be a mistake to assume that these are the only issues
that rural voters will weigh when making their choices on
election-day. Taking a longer term perspective, it is clear
that because rural voters are not a homogeneous group--as
we have shown, they vary especially by region-- it can only
beneﬁt both the Democrats and the Republicans if they
begin to listen more attentively to the views of their rural
constituents state by state. This may not yield clear electoral
beneﬁts in November 2006, but it will position the respective
party oﬃcials and candidates to be attuned to the views of
what may emerge as the salient swing voters in select states
in future elections.
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1

Regional categorization throughout this report follow the
standard categories used by the United States Census Bureau
and are as follows: East: Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Mid-West: Wisconsin, Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas. South:
District of Columbia, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida,
Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas,
Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Texas. West: Montana, Idaho,
Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico,
Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, and Hawaii.
2

Other than the Gallup poll data depicted in Figure 9, the
attitudinal data reported in this report are derived from the
General Social Survey conducted almost every year since
1972 by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. The GSS cumulative data can be accessed
on the web: www.icpsr.umich.edu/gss. The question wording on whether the respondent is a born again Christian is:
“Would you say you have been “born-again” or have had a
“born-again” experience, that is, a turning point in your life
when you committed yourself to Christ.” On abortion, the
GSS asks respondents a series of closed-response questions:
“Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if….she
became pregnant as a result of rape; the woman’s health is
seriously endangered; there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby; she cannot aﬀord to have more children; she
is married and does not want any more children; the woman
wants it for any reason. On same-sex relations, the GSS asks
respondents (following similar questions about extra-marital
and teenage sexual relations), a closed response question:
“What about sexual relations between two adults of the same
sex--do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong,
sometimes wrong, or not wrong at all?”
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